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CONTRACT DYNAMICS: LESSONS FROM EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
 
Magali CHAUDEY* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The recognition that contracts have a time dimension has given rise to a very abundant 
literature since the end of the 1980s. In such a dynamic context, the contract may take 
place over several periods and develop repeated interactions. Then, the principal topics 
of the analysis are commitment, reputation, memory and the renegotiation of the 
contract. Few papers have tried to apply the predictions of dynamic contract theory to 
data. The examples of applications introduced in this article show the relevance of the 
change from a static contractual framework to a dynamic one. In a dynamic context, 
contracts are more sophisticated and can include commitment or a better revelation of 
the type of agent (insurance contract); contracts are more flexible (franchise contract) 
or offer a better measurement of information asymmetry and effort level (insurance or 
work contract). 
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1. Introduction 
 
For this article, we use P.A. Chiappori and B. Salanié’s definition of contract theory 
(1997), according to which the theory describes the relationship between agents who 
seek to achieve a common goal through collaboration. This relationship leads to 
transfers between agents and a product. In its simplest form, the theory states that once 
the contract is signed, the parties can make decisions according to their own 
preferences and the terms of the contract. They become separate once more at the end 
of the contract. Several criteria enable us to distinguish different theoretical contract 
models, which can be structured according to the following: the nature of the 
information asymmetries; the preferences of each agent in view of the risks involved; 
the comprehensiveness of the contract; or the static vs. dynamic nature of the model. 
 The informational context is decisive for each contract model. This theory 
distinguishes two different types: adverse selection (where the information is 
incomplete) and moral hazard (where the information is imperfect). Adverse selection 
appears when the asymmetry bears upon the characteristics of the informed party. 
Moral hazard appears when the asymmetry bears upon the behavior of the agent or his 
effort. The principal-agent model is the most representative model of contract theory.1 
wherein these hypotheses of information asymmetry are associated with those of 
incentive and delegation.  
 In fact, contractual relationships are more complex than contract theory depicts, 
particularly because those parties involved in a contract meet on more than one 
occasion, thereby conferring a temporal dimension to that contract. This observation 
justifies the desire to inscribe contract theory within a dynamic framework that will 
allow the introduction of new concepts, such as commitment, memory or renegotiation, 
to the theoretical contractual framework. 
 This dynamic dimension for contracts was introduced by the theoretical literature 
in the 1980s. More recent econometric tests, carried out upon dynamic contracts, have 
established the importance of the background behind contractual relationships, as they 
seek to understand the determining factors of contractual models. This question of 
contractual determinants is identical to that raised by the empirical studies in the static 
framework, but the characteristics of the informational context and the tools that are 
available for the evaluation of the informational asymmetries are different. One 
                                                 
1- The framework for contract theory that has been retained for this article excludes the theory of 
transaction costs from its field of analysis (B. Salanié [2005], P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont [2004]). 
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fundamental question for studies developed in a dynamic framework is that of the 
distinction that exists between adverse selection and moral hazard; such a distinction 
cannot be made empirically within a static framework. 
 We aim to show how the empirical analyses envisage different integration 
modalities for the temporal dimension. The first modality involves studying panel data 
to measure the evolution of some variables in time and according to each individual; 
therefore, it will be possible to evaluate variables that are immeasurable (or poorly 
measurable) within the static framework.2A second introductory modality for contract 
dynamics begins with the hypothesis that certain variables have, by definition, a 
historical dimension, such as the bonus-malus system for car insurance, which takes 
into account the policy-holder’s past accident history.  
 Whether the studies are carried out within either a static or a dynamic framework, 
the problem remains the same: to understand the factors that determine the choice of 
contracts, given the informational context and the characteristics of the contracting 
parties, and measure their effect upon their remuneration. By reviewing the empirical 
literature on contract dynamics, this article aims to demonstrate the relevance of a 
transition toward a dynamic context. It endeavors to understand how enriching these 
studies are by comparison with those carried out within a static framework and to 
pinpoint the specific nature of contracts according to the sector in question. The 
originality of this review is to insist on the dynamics of the contracts and the associated 
applications, focusing neither on a particular sector nor on a single informational 
framework.3 
 In the second part of this article, we will recall the static framework of contract 
theory and its derived empirical analyses. In the third part, we will show how the 
analysis of dynamic contracts has made a contribution, especially to the differentiation 
between adverse selection and moral hazard. In the fourth part, we will present the 
dynamic framework and its associated applications. We have retained the applications 
to insurance contracts, labor contracts and franchise contracts. The final part will 
present our conclusions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2- An example is the measurement of a worker’s effort level, through the observation of his career, which is 
supposedly in correlation with his past efforts.  
 
3- For a survey on empirical literature concerning insurance contracts (adverse selection), see the study by 
A. Cohen and P. Siegelman [2010] 
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2. The Static analysis of contracts: characteristics and main limitations 
 
2.1. The theoretical framework for static analysis 
 
Contract theory defines a relationship between agents who seek to achieve their 
goal through collaboration. This relation generates a product and leads to transfers 
between agents. From this framework, there derives a general hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between the contract model, the performance of the contractual 
relationship and the resulting transfers between agents. Such a hypothesis may be 
subjected to testable predictions and empirical applications. 
 For these tests to be successful, three types of information are necessary: (i) the 
characteristics of each agent, which are known to the other parties (verifiable 
variables), (ii) characteristics of the contract, specifically the transfers carried out 
between the agents (wages, dividends, insurance bonuses, for instance), (iii) results of 
the relationship, or performance, which, depending on the context, may be in terms of 
the production level, profit or the accident frequency. 
 For static analysis, the hypothesis according to which a correlation exists between 
the results of the relationship and the transfers may take two different forms according 
to the nature of the informational asymmetry. In the context of moral hazard, one 
would expect remuneration to be connected to the performances of the relationship 
whilst being less volatile than those performances. Indeed, the principal, or the 
uninformed party of the contract, has no guarantee that the recorded performance is 
entirely the result of effort (and not merely a stroke of good or bad fortune). To rule out 
any doubt, the remuneration and performance need to be positively correlated, but not 
proportional. In a context of adverse selection, the agents reveal themselves by opting 
for a contract, which has been elaborated in such a way as to take their own 
characteristics into account and therefore produces different results. In this instance, a 
correlation between performance and transfers may be expected, and it is the informed 
party who, by means of the contract, will decide the intensity of the relation between 
these two variables. 
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2.2. Econometric applications 
 
There are many empirical applications of contract theory within a static 
framework. They are generally related to labor, insurance, franchise, agricultural 
contracts or auctions mechanism. These applications are usually concerned with 
questions relating to the choice of contract design, given the informational context. 
Such questioning highlights the importance of the empirical measurement of 
information asymmetries. Within this static framework, the test evaluates the 
contract’s level of dependency vis-à-vis the agents’ heterogeneity, whether it be 
through an agent’s characteristics, i.e., the risk level presented by the agent (adverse 
selection) or through his behavior, i.e., the occurrence of a risky event (moral hazard). 
From an econometrical point of view, what is being tested is the correlation between a 
risk and a type of contract (J.H. Abbring, P.A. Chiappori, J.J. Heckmann and J. Pinquet 
[2003]), without any possibility of distinguishing between adverse selection and moral 
hazard from an empirical point of view.  
 
 There are many econometrical tests carried out upon insurance data. Insurance 
companies have access to comprehensive data concerning the characteristics of both 
the insured persons and their contracts. Furthermore, Insurance is one of the rare 
sectors in which the result of an insured person’s actions is easily accessible. M. 
Rothschild and J. Stiglitz [1976] were forerunners in the work carried out upon 
informational asymmetries in Insurance. In their article, the authors present the case of 
an insurance market where two types of people can be found: low-risk and high-risk 
individuals. The type of each agent is stipulated. The equilibrium of this market is such 
that, the high-risk agents choose total coverage, whereas the low-risk agents prefer the 
less expensive partial coverage. These low-risk agents therefore accept being under-
insured to avoid being over-charged. High-risk agents make the opposite choice. They 
opt for total coverage because a reduction in their insurance costs is not a sufficient 
incentive for them to prefer partial coverage, in view of their type. 
 
  Within a static framework, the modeling of adverse selection leads to agents being 
presented on the basis of constant parameters, reflecting qualities that are known only 
to themselves. Adverse selection is then tested using cross-section data, thereby 
allowing a possible correlation between those parameters and the choice of contract or 
the occurrence of a risk.  
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 The tests that have been devised in a static framework for adverse selection follow 
the work of M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz. Based upon the hypothesis that the insured 
person is more aware of his own risk factors than the insurer is, P.A. Chiappori and B. 
Salanié [1997] test the following hypothesis: if equilibrium exists, it will be separating, 
in the sense that the insurance company offers the insured person to choose among a 
menu of contracts. The contracts vary according to the cost and the level of coverage. A 
higher level of coverage is associated with a higher cost and ex post a greater risk factor. 
When an agent chooses his contract, he reveals his level of risk.4 From an 
econometrical point of view, this hypothesis basically tests the correlation between an 
equation relative to contract choice and another one concerning occurrence of 
accidents. Where there is no correlation one may conclude that there is no adverse 
selection. Chiappori and Salanié’s method is representative of the static method of 
testing for correlation between contract choice and informational asymmetries. 
 
 Given two probit equations, the first concerning the choice of contract and the 
other concerning risk occurrence, 
 where i = 1... n represents the insured persons, 
1iy =  if * 0i i iy Xβ ε >= +  ,  
Otherwise 0iy =    
  This probit concerns the choice of contract with yi = 1, where the insured person 
chooses total coverage at the beginning of the year and 0 otherwise. Xi represents all of 
the exogenous variables that may be observed by the insurer and which enable us to 
characterize the person i.  is the parameter vector, which enables us to conduct an 
estimation, and εi is the error term, which enables us to grasp the agents’ unobserved 
heterogeneity, once the observable variables have been taken into account. However, 
this may just be a reflection of the agents’ differing positions vis-à-vis the risk. 
1iz =  if  * 0i i iz Xγ η >= +  
Otherwise 0iz =   
 This probit concerns accident occurrence with zi = 1, where the insured person has 
an accident during the year and 0 otherwise;  is the vector of the parameters which 
need to be estimated and η i is the error term, which allows for the unobserved 
heterogeneity of the risk borne by the agent. 
                                                 
4- It may be noted that, where there is a correlation, it is possible to deduce that the insurer’s price scale 
policy varies according to the type of person insured. 
-7- 
 
 When informational asymmetry exists, it appears with a positive correlation 
between yi and zi conditional to Xi, which is the equivalent of a correlation between εi 
and η i. Where the hypothesis is null εi and η i are not correlated, the two probit 
equations are independent, that is, the contract choice and the occurrence of accidents 
are not related, and there is no problem for adverse selection. From an econometric 
point of view, the test may be carried out in three different ways (Chiappori and 
Salanié, [1997] and [2000]).5 
(i) The first is to test two probit equations independently and then test their 
independence via a score test. 
(ii) The second is to evaluate the two probit equations simultaneously by constructing a 
bivariate probit, which will account for the fact that unobservable factors are inter-
correlated. The bivariate probit estimates the correlation ρ between the two error terms 
of the equations. 
(iii) The third possible test is based upon the hypothesis that the two preceding tests 
are too dependent upon the chosen functional form (linear model, parametrical 
framework). The non-parametric approach consists of combining the different 
parameters which define agent profiles. A contingency table is then made up, 
regrouping agents with identical characteristics in each cell. For each agent category, 
the correlation between agent characteristics and contract type is then tested using a 
chi-squared test. 
 The various empirical studies carried out for the car insurance sector show that 
there are no adverse selection problems. This result has been verified with French data 
(P.A. Chiappori and B. Salanié [2000]) and data from Quebec (G. Dionne, C. 
Gouriéroux and C. Vanasse [2001]). This absence of adverse selection can be explained 
in various ways. Theoretical models suppose an asymmetry of information favorable to 
the insured party. However, this assumption is often unrealistic: the policy-holder 
himself has imperfect information (ignorance of some of his characteristics, incapacity 
to associate his characteristics to his probability of accidents). In some cases, private 
information is held only by part of the population of reference; for example, the 
experienced drivers are better informed on their type than beginners. This explanation 
                                                 
5- In the article written in 2000, P.A. Chiappori and B. Salanié worked on a population of young drivers. As 
this population was relatively homogeneous there were fewer issues of heteroskedasticity, and the driver’s 
experience (or lack of) brought no bias to the evaluations (young drivers’ different levels of experience are 
not taken into account which us allows one to dispense with the question of no-claims bonus – surcharge). 
The other specificity of the tests carried out for this article is that the risk occurrence is measured by the 
number of accident reports and not the accidents themselves. The choice to report an accident or not, 
however, lies with the insured person, and this choice is strongly related to the type of contract. In other 
words, a non-covered accident will not be reported! This ex post moral risk generates a correlation between 
the type of contract and the probability of there being a report, even when there is no ex ante moral risk.  
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justifies, in particular, that the results of A. Cohen [2005] are different from those 
previously presented. On Israeli automobile insurance data, the author concluded the 
presence of adverse selection. However, this adverse selection is recognized on the 
subsample of the drivers with more than three years of experience and not on the young 
drivers. Another interpretation of this result might be that insurers are able to interpret 
informational asymmetry problems correctly and are, therefore, able to offer contracts 
menus that are likely to minimize the occurrence, especially in the competitive 
insurance market, when insurers are able to offer a wide choice of contracts (K. Saito 
[2006]).  
 
 Beyond the empirical approach, which has been suggested previously, the general 
teaching of contract theory is that, within an adverse selection framework, the agents 
who are observed are supposedly identical and are faced with a number of contracts 
menus from which they are free to choose. Among these menus, the contracts offering 
greater coverage are chosen by agents presenting a greater risk, that is, a higher 
probability of accident or illness. These contracts are sold at a higher cost; in other 
words, the marginal cost rate6 should increase with the level of coverage. The contracts 
menu enables the insured person to reveal his type. 
 If we consider the context of moral hazard, we must assume that the choice of 
contract will affect the insured person’s future behavior. The agent with a high risk 
factor who has chosen a high coverage level is likely to be less cautious. The probability 
of a risk event occurring is therefore higher. In the specific case of insurance contracts, 
moral hazard refers to the impact of insurance upon the call for limiting risks. As with 
cases of adverse selection, there is a need to test the correlation between the types of 
contract and risk. 
 Ultimately, the theoretical models upon which these tests are based assume that 
there is informational context that only grants empirical studies the option of 
correlating contracts with risks. As A. Cohen [2002] points out however, highlighting a 
correlation between the type of coverage and the number of accidents merely signifies 
that the hypothesis of moral hazard cannot be rejected. However, both moral hazard 
and adverse selection reveal a coverage-accident correlation; from an empirical stance, 
it is difficult to distinguish between the two forms of asymmetry. The studies carried 
out within a static framework are, therefore, obliged to state the nature of the 
                                                 
6- This rate is assimilated to the necessary increase in the cost of the insurance coverage for each 
additional monetary unit. 
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asymmetry as a working hypothesis, as for example, do P.A. Chiappori and B. Salanié, 
[1997] and [2000]. 
 
 The applications of contract theory within a static framework are also confronted 
with some econometrical difficulties. One serious problem concerns the measurement 
of the key variables in this theory, in particular that of effort in a moral hazard model. It 
is true that, as the theoretical models show, this variable is unobservable not only by 
the principal but also by the econometrician. Another important problem in these 
studies is the endogeneity of choice for the type of contract: for many models, there is 
an attempt to identify the contract’s determining factors, the design of which, however, 
is assumed. Similarly, for certain applications, the question is centered upon the factors 
that determine the choice of contract (sharecropping vs. fixed rent contracts, franchise 
vs. owned units) when the underlying question of production delegation is not even 
broached. 
 Some of these econometrical problems may be overcome by the applications that 
have been developed within a dynamic framework, even though the primary motivation 
for these applications remains the construction of a more realistic working framework.  
 
 
3. Informational asymmetries within a dynamic framework 
 
 Contractual reasoning within a dynamic framework has significantly renewed the 
way that informational asymmetries are represented. In the context of adverse 
selection, the dynamic theoretical models may render static models more complex in 
two different ways. Either one assumes that the agent’s type does not change over time 
and in which case carrying the contract out allows information to be revealed, which 
then leads to the contract being renegotiated, or the agent type does change over time,7 
which then raises the question of how the sharing of risks between the contract parties 
evolves as well as the smoothing of incomes over time. 
 In a moral hazard context, the dynamic models have three characteristics. First, 
the agent is incited to take more risks because he is partially insured against the loss of 
income thanks to the smoothing of his income over time. Secondly, the principal 
acquires more information concerning the agent’s behavior thanks to his regular 
                                                 
7- If the agent’s type changes, then so too does his reservation utility, which renders the maximisation 
program more complex, as it is defined in static contract theory models. 
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observation of that behavior. Finally, a long-term contract may be more effective than 
repeated spot contracts, as the agent has to manage different periods (in terms of 
savings or consumption, for example). 
 
 
3.1 Adverse selection and moral hazard within a dynamic framework 
 
Several studies using dynamic data assume the hypothesis that it is possible to 
distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. According to P.A. Chiappori, 
[1994], differentiating between moral hazard and adverse selection brings us back to a 
causality problem. In a moral hazard context, people’s (unobservable) actions that 
affect the contracts’ performance are the result of the contracts’ form. For instance, a 
contract could be the cause of an increase in risk because the encouragement for 
caution is diminished (G. Dionne [1998]). In the context of adverse selection, the 
differentiated nature of the risks precedes the drawing up of the contracts: the choice of 
contract is the result of the type of risk that best represents the insured person. There is 
indeed a form of inverted causality between these two informational problems. 
 The tests for distinguishing between moral hazard and adverse selection presented 
in the empirical literature consist of simultaneously analyzing the processes that 
determine risk occurrence and choice of contract. These aim to identify the variables 
that may be able to explain these two processes and the time lag that exists between 
them. The question that arises is that of discovering whether it is the risk that 
determines the choice of contract (adverse selection) or whether changes in contract 
clauses engender changes in behavior (moral hazard). There are two possible 
approaches. First, we may assume that the form of the optimal contract differs 
according to the informational contract. We then seek to identify the contracts’ 
qualitative characteristics to discover the nature of the informational asymmetry that 
each contract is supposed to correct. A second approach assumes the existence of 
contracts (possibly sub-optimal) and studies their influence upon observed behavior 
(for example one might observe the influence of a contract upon the driver’s behavior, 
which includes a bonus-malus clause and reaches the conclusion that there might be a 
moral hazard problem).  
 For J.H. Abbring, P.A. Chiappori and J.Pinquet [2003], using dynamic data to 
distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard, constitutes a problem similar 
to that of distinguishing between state dependence and dependence vis-à-vis 
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unobserved heterogeneity (J. Heckman [1981]). On the one hand, moral hazard refers 
to a particular case of dependence upon the state: in the same way that an individual 
person is more likely to become unemployed if he already has been in the past, an 
individual person who has had several accidents in the past has a higher risk of having 
another in the future. The bonus-malus system may therefore be defined as a specific 
case of state dependence. On the other hand, adverse selection refers to the particular 
case of dependence upon unobserved heterogeneity: the person’s individual 
characteristics change over time and condition the choice of contract and therefore risk 
occurrence. In the same way individual characteristics may explain a person’s present 
and future employability. 
 
 
3.2 The econometric tools to differentiate between adverse selection and moral hazard 
 
Within a dynamic framework, it is possible to see that there are many tools that 
enable us to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. One tool involves 
taking the driver’s experience into account and considering it specifically as a variable 
that might explain the risk factor. In which case, tests for correlation between contract 
and risk are able to measure informational asymmetry. By the same logic, it may well 
be relevant to take the driver’s learning history into account, as through experience, he 
will have acquired information concerning his own level of risk and may thus make a 
better choice of contract from the menu of options that he is being offered. 
A second tool involves studying panel data to comprehend the “history” of the 
contractual relationship. This historical dimension enables us to distinguish between 
moral hazard and adverse selection, as the qualitative characteristics of the contract 
vary according to the two different informational contexts. In the context of adverse 
selection, the contract has a monotonous memory (past performances have equal 
weight). For moral hazard, the memory is more of a “short-term” nature and concedes 
more weight to recent events. Empirical analysis shows that, a posteriori, contracts 
may enable us to distinguish between these two contexts (P.A. Chiappori and J. 
Heckman [2000]). Under the bonus-malus system, the cost of an accident in terms of 
future premiums depends on the number of previous accidents. In the context of moral 
hazard, one expects a negative correlation between claims in t1 and accidents in t2, 
because the bonus-malus system incites the driver to be careful. Under adverse 
selection, in contrast, a negative correlation is expected. Indeed, accident claims in t1 
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show a high-risk driver, and this characteristic can explain the number of accidents in 
t2 (A. Cohen and P. Siegelman [2010]). 
 
This review concentrates on three representative types of contract: the insurance 
contract, the labor contract and the franchise contract. In our opinion, such a choice is 
justified due to the extensive and comprehensive information that the insurance sector 
provides for empirical studies. The implementation of labor contracts is based upon 
problems that are in touch with the more theoretical framework (contracts with 
memory and renegotiation) and which offer original solutions for the measurement of 
effort levels. Finally, studies carried out upon franchise contracts can be generalized 
following the analysis of the dynamics governing other forms of inter-firm contracts. 
We will demonstrate that, depending upon the type of contract, the determining 
variables may change: in the case of insurance, the influence of informational 
asymmetries is clear (repeated adverse selection or moral hazard). In the case of labor 
contracts, it is the contract memory and the access to credit that are the determining 
variables. Finally, for the analysis of franchise contracts, the main concern of the 
relevant literature is the maturity of the network and the contract clauses.  
 
 
4. The empirical analysis of dynamic contracts 
 
Beyond the static framework, contract theory includes the idea that a contract is 
usually carried out over several periods and gives rise to repeated interactions. This 
amounts to stipulating that a contract may have a dynamic dimension (D. Fudenberg, 
B.Holstrom and P. Milgrom [1990], J. Malcolmson and F. Spinnewyn [1988], P. Rey 
and B. Salanié [1990], W. Rogerson [1985]). As soon as one begins to take an interest in 
theoretical dynamic models, the themes that are developed are commitment, 
reputation, memory or renegotiation. 
 When it is applied to a contract, the distinction between the static and dynamic 
frameworks may be based on the analysis of different types of commitment. B. Salanié 
[2005] differentiates between four types: (i) spot commitment, when the contract only 
holds for the current period; (ii) full commitment, when the contract that has been 
signed covers the whole duration of the contract and may not be renegotiated or 
breached; (iii) long-term commitment with renegotiation, where if the contract covers 
the whole duration of the relationship and can be renegotiated multilaterally, it can 
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only be renegotiated if all of the parties agree; (iv) short-term commitment, with a 
time-limit and which includes all of the intermediate cases between spot commitment 
and long-term commitment. Only long-term commitment is in fact situated within a 
dynamic framework, its particularity being that it allows information to be disclosed 
gradually. 
 When the contract is a long-term one, it is preferable that the principal signs a 
complete contract8 that covers the whole duration of the relationship. Therefore, there 
can be no renegotiation,9 which might lead to a sub-optimal solution. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that when the parties are engaged in a long-term contract, certain clauses may 
reveal themselves to be ineffectual ex-post because they are inappropriate for the 
evolution of the contractual relationship. The passage towards the dynamic framework 
enables a more realistic representation of the commitment and the associated contract 
as well as a better control of informational asymmetries. 
 
 
4.1. Insurance contracts 
 
 Due to the informational asymmetries that concern the characteristics and 
behavior of the insured people, the insurers offer contracts menus that are likely to 
reveal hidden information. If the contract takes place over a single period, the insurers 
develop pricing and discriminatory coverage techniques. The idea then is to offer 
contracts menus in which the premiums and the coverage are positively correlated. 
Therefore, people who are at risk choose a contract with extensive coverage and a high 
premium. However, these single-period contracts do not give the insurers access to all 
of the information necessary for them to provide the best contract offer. For instance, 
past incidents are determining factors that encourage the insured person to reveal his 
ex ante risk level through his choice of contract. 
 For some time, theoretical insurance models have shown that past experience 
rating, which is a variable that can be considered a personal characteristic, is a means 
of reducing problems of adverse selection (G. Dionne, N. Doherty and N. Fombaron 
[2000]) and moral hazard (R. Winter [2000]). This pricing system is widely 
                                                 
8- A contract is complete if it takes into account all the states of the nature which are or will be necessary 
throughout the duration of the contract. 
 
9- Within a long-term context, renegotiation is considered to be a consequence of the agents’ opportunism. 
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implemented in car insurance through the bonus-malus mechanism. This method of 
analyzing pricing is based upon a dynamic representation of insurance contracts. 
 
 
4.1.1. The repeated adverse selection framework 
 
Within a dynamic framework, adverse selection emerges continuously. Empirical 
studies test the relationship between a risk’s occurrence sequences and the choice of 
contract. For instance, agents who learn that their risk level is on average higher to that 
of the rest of the population are more likely to change contract in favor of one with a 
better coverage. When adverse selection is repeated over several periods, the disclosure 
mechanism becomes more complex and even less efficient.  
 The article written by R. Cooper and B. Hayes [1987] is one of the first to look into 
bi-periodical insurance contracts. These authors propose a repeated adverse-selection 
model where the simple selection model is repeated from one period to the next. The 
contract is perfectly defined, and both the insurer and the insured person may commit 
on the basis of their future behavior. This is a long-term contract with total 
commitment. The authors conclude that it is necessary that an insurer offer dynamic 
contracts pooling to deal with the question of adverse selection. Their main result is 
that there is equilibrium when people with a higher probability of having an accident 
opt for a full-insurance contract. This contract is independent from past accidents and 
therefore remains unchanged in time. To those people with a lower accident 
probability, the insurer will offer a partial insurance contract, priced according to their 
level of experience. Indeed, it is in the best interest of this category of insured person to 
disclose his type and experience, thereby ensuring for himself a lower insurance 
premium. 
 Cooper and Hayes do not subject their results to an empirical analysis. Their 
approach does, however, deserve some consideration, as it opens the field to other 
studies on multi-period contracts, in particular that of G Dionne and N. Doherty 
[1994]. In this article, Dionne and Doherty apply J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole’s model 
[1990]. They set their reasoning within a framework of competition between different 
insurance contracts based upon a bi-periodical model with unilateral commitment: the 
insurer may commit to keeping a client, whereas the latter remains free to choose 
another insurer. Within such a context, the authors demonstrate that the best long-
term contract including renegotiation is one that differentiates between the first and 
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second periods and is thus qualified as a partial commitment. During the first period, 
the contract is a pooling contract, that is, there is total coverage for high-risk agents 
and partial coverage for those who are at less risk. At the beginning of the second 
period, the insurer offers two pairs of contracts: one pair for the insured people who 
have had an accident during the first period (regardless of whether they are high- or 
low-risk clients) and one pair for those who have not had any accidents. The offer made 
for the second period takes the information gathered during the first period into 
account which incites the insured people to further disclosure at the onset of the second 
period. In this model, we may note a tendency to reduce the problem of adverse 
selection due to the accumulation of information over time.  Dionne and Doherty’s 
model was tested upon Californian data for the 1985-1987 period. The results show that 
some companies do indeed choose partial commitment strategies to attract low-risk 
clients who are more inclined to change companies according to the prices that they 
offer. Therefore, Cooper and Hayes’ theoretical conclusions are validated: the 
information which is collected favors the defining of contracts that are more in keeping 
with the agents’ characteristics and thus encourage them towards disclosure. Such 
disclosure contributes in turn to defining contracts that are appropriate to the risk level 
of each agent. 
 
 
4.1.2. The repeated moral hazard framework 
 
 By hypothesizing that the agent’s strategy is stable in time in terms of effort, a 
sufficiently long observation of that effort will enable the principal to infer with 
increasing accuracy what the agent’s choice will be. Therefore, the principal may 
conceive an appropriate sanction system to reach an allocation that approaches the 
first-best. Such a framework was developed by A. Rubinstein and M. Yaari [1983], who 
demonstrate that if neither the principal nor the agent have a preference for the present 
situation, then a first-best equilibrium has been achieved, assuming that the interaction 
between the principal and the agent may be repeated ad infinitum. 
 The article written by P.A. Chiappori and J. Heckman [2000] is rooted in a 
framework of repeated moral hazard. The authors present the experience as a 
determining variable for defining the contract in such an informational context: an 
accident will impact the forthcoming premium; if the memory is long, then the impact 
will have repercussions upon the whole range of future premiums. Within a moral-
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hazard framework, the insurance price scale presents a correlation between the 
insurance premium and the accident process.  
 The authors’ intuition is that, all things being equal, the optimal effort level should 
increase along with the cost of the premium; that is, a higher premium should incite the 
insured person to more caution, as caution ought to reduce the probability of a 
forthcoming accident. However, the existence of an unobserved heterogeneity may 
cause an opposite effect: good drivers pay lower premiums as they have had fewer 
accidents in the past. Furthermore there is a lower probability of their having any 
future accidents. In this case, it is the low premium that creates the incentive towards 
effort. The premium is associated with the insured person’s characteristics (adverse 
selection). 
 Econometric studies allow a distinction to be made between the two cases. 
Differentiating between adverse selection and moral hazard amounts to identifying an 
eventual unobserved heterogeneity, which is typical of the adverse selection framework. 
Therefore, the testable prediction is as follows: by controlling individual characteristics 
(including unobserved heterogeneity), the risk of an accident occurring should increase 
over a period without any accidents and then decrease after an accident. Various tests 
may be envisaged according to the availability of the data. (i) In the most favorable 
situations, the econometrician has the exact date of the accident; accident occurrence 
may then be modeled within a continuous time frame using a duration model. (ii) In 
most cases however, the econometrician only has the information concerning the 
number of accidents over a given period of time (usually a year). For an agent i 
observed over t periods, the available data refer to the number of accidents and the year 
during which each accident occurred. Each agent is then identified over this t period by 
a series with a value of 0 or 1, and a dynamic analysis becomes possible. (iii) A final 
approach, which is minimalistic in terms of the available data, allocates a coefficient to 
each driver who has driven during the t periods and has had n number of accidents, 
regardless of the exact timing of these accidents. 
 When applied to case (i), the test stipulates that if moral hazard is recognized, then 
the probability of there being accidents, conditional to the observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity, should increase regularly over an accident-free period and then decrease 
following an accident. In case (ii), an additional hypothesis is introduced: during the 
observation period, the probability of an agent’s having an accident remains constant. 
We then consider a set of agents having had identical series of accidents (identical 
duration and average number of accidents), although the order of the accidents is 
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different within the set. When the hypothesis is null (absence of moral hazard) these 
sets should all incur the same probabilities. This is not the case however, when moral 
hazard does occur: for each period, the probability of there being an accident changes 
according to the occurrences of accidents during the previous period. In situation (iii), 
the additional hypothesis is that the unobserved heterogeneity within the population is 
identical, no matter what the cohort observed. When the hypothesis is null, the 
probability of there being an accident is identical for all drivers, whatever their 
experience, no matter what the value of their coefficient may be.  
 In each of these cases, the accident dynamics are used to test the presence of moral 
hazard against the null hypothesis according to which accident probability does not 
depend upon the past behavior of the insured person. Chiappori and Heckman reach 
the conclusion that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: accident probability 
depends not upon the past accident record of the agents but rather upon observable 
characteristics such as the age of the insured person or that of the vehicle involved. 
 
 
4.1.3. Dynamic contracts and learning 
 
Symmetrical learning is another informational hypothesis upon which the dynamic 
analysis of insurance contracts may be based. The contract parties do not know the 
risks that characterize the insured person. With each new period of the relationship, 
they learn by observing the results (for instance, the number of accidents during the 
period or an employee’s performances) and, at the same time, adjust their knowledge 
(within the framework of optimal contracts). These models rely upon incomplete but 
symmetrical information hypotheses and upon learning. 
 I. Hendel and A. Lizzeri’s article [2003] falls within this framework. Their study 
concerns life-insurance contracts. The insured people are presented as a heterogeneous 
group, and there is unilateral commitment. The authors demonstrate that, in the long 
term, for a given contract, high-risk insured people would do better to quit the contract 
as soon as their risk level becomes known. Similarly, low-risk people whose insurance 
premiums are highest given their type would also, in the long run, do better to opt for 
another contract. Therefore, the authors highlight the fact that the risk reclassification 
market does run efficiently if the insured person and the insurer symmetrically become 
aware of the insured person’s risk level. Such a phenomenon reveals a weakness within 
the insurance markets. In equilibrium, it is therefore preferable that the insurance 
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contract should be front-loading,10 to reduce the better clients’ incentive to quit the 
contract.11 Hendel and Lizzeri validate the theory whereby front-loading contracts hold 
the consumer to the contract and introduce a form of insured party commitment, 
thereby limiting his mobility. 
 
This idea of commitment may also be found in the article written by K. Crocker and 
J. Moran [1997], which is concerned with the health insurance provided by employers 
in the United States. Commitment in this case is represented by the difficulties that an 
employee may encounter when attempting to change jobs as, within the American 
system, health insurance is most often connected to employment.12 In a theoretical 
approach, Crocker and Moran show that when an employer offers the same contract to 
all of his employees, then the optimal contract provides limited coverage, which is 
inversely proportionate to the barriers to job mobility (Job lock) encountered by those 
employees. If the employer is able, however, to offer a variety of contracts appropriate 
to his employee’s characteristics, the optimal contract will include total coverage for 
medical care. The premium calculated for the second period can only be partially based 
upon the employee’s state of health. These theoretical predictions are confirmed by the 
econometrical studies:13 firms whose insurance contracts only offer one type of 
coverage see that coverage decreases as the barriers to job mobility increase. Firms who 
offer their employees multiple contracts provide higher levels of coverage, in which 
case the coverage is independent of the employees’ degree of job mobility. 
 
 The papers we have mentioned before introduce a symmetrical-learning hypothesis. 
This learning concerns the risk level of the insured agent but has no effect on the 
information asymmetry that exists between insurer and insured party. Some works set 
down that learning could favor one contract party. A. Cohen [2005] demonstrates that 
more experienced drivers benefit from a learning effect, which explains the presence of 
adverse selection for this sub-sample (correlation between insurance and risk). 
                                                 
10- A front-loading contract is structured such that one pays for a service that will only be used at a later 
date; this is the case, for instance, of care insurance. 
 
11- These clients are actually better than the contract initially anticipated.  
 
12- The majority of Americans (60%) are covered by private health insurance, most frequently offered by 
the employers. Employees are free to choose whether or not they subscribe to the health coverage provided 
by their employer. 
 
13- The econometrical test is a probit that is organised into three levels of health care. The sample consists 
of 8191 American employees and refers to the year 1987. 
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 Other articles propose a different context for asymmetric learning. They postulate 
that experienced drivers would further underestimate the number of past accidents 
when they change insurance companies. Likewise, an insurer would be better off 
contracting with the same drivers from one period on the other. In this case, he has an 
informational advantage over competitors. The insurer achieves this advantage by 
learning.  
 A. Cohen [2008] examines this context. Her paper uses a rich dataset obtained 
from an Israeli insurance company, and the results are consistent with the predictions 
of the asymmetric-learning theory. (i) The insurer makes higher profits on policies he 
sells to repeat customers. (ii) These profits are driven by profits from repeat customers 
who have a clean record. (iii) These profits are generated not merely by charging these 
customers higher premiums but primarily by the lower costs that clean record 
policyholders impose on the company. (iv) The tendency of customers with bad records 
is to leave their insurer, so the policies of the pool of repeat customers are high quality. 
According to A. Cohen, the renewal of contracts allows the insurer to obtain better 
information concerning the insured party, to the detriment of competitors. 
 
Applications carried out upon insurance contract data are far more numerous and 
more detailed. The sector affords a great diversity of contracts that are likely to uphold 
certain teachings of contract theory, in particular the importance of commitment 
within a dynamic context. The peculiarity of the contracts analyzed by the empirical 
literature is that they all reflect a part of the insured person’s “history”. Integrating this 
temporal dimension gives special qualities to these contracts: efficient control of 
informational asymmetries thanks to the insured person’s commitment (front-loading 
contract or job lock system) or a more accurate disclosure of the insured person’s type 
(contract pooling). 
 
 
4.2. Labor contracts 
 
Once contracts are considered in terms of a timeframe, it is logical to suppose that 
they have a memory. The idea of a contract having a memory was introduced by W. 
Rogerson [1985]. This concept was then taken up and applied to labor contracts by P.A. 
Chiappori and I. Macho-Stadler [1990] and to insurance by G. Dionne, M. Maurice, J. 
Pinquet and C. Vanasse [2001]. Their hypothesis is that the payment received by the 
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agent at the end of each period depends upon the relationship’s past history (for 
instance, past performances) and upon the results for that period. The models for 
contracts “with memory” distinguish between “memory of consumption”, if one opts for 
the agent’s standpoint (the agent’s consumption depends upon the payment he received 
during that, and preceding periods), and the “memory of wages”, if one takes the stance 
of the principal (the salary paid for the present period being dependent upon past 
income). Chiappori and Macho-Stadler specify that according to the informational 
context, the optimal contract may or may not have a memory. When information is 
incomplete and symmetrical, the contract has a memory and takes into account the 
totality of past performances (each past performance contributing information to the 
unknown parameter). In the case of pure adverse selection, however, the optimal 
contract has no memory, and the principal simply repeats the same contract from one 
period to the next. Therefore, he commits to not using information gathered during 
previous periods, which the agent would otherwise be better off not revealing! In the 
case of repeated moral hazard, whether a contract has a memory or not depends upon 
other variables such as access to credit. 
 It is possible to test contract memory econometrically. More precisely, it is the 
absence of memory that is tested, via the lack of residual auto-correlation or the 
insignificance of a memory variable (career, promotion...). 
 The conclusions which are reached for repeated moral hazard clearly depend upon 
the characteristics of the financial environment, in particular those related to access to 
the credit market. Many models assume that the amounts transferred during each 
period have a direct influence upon the level of monetary consumption, which means 
that the money can neither be saved nor borrowed to increase its consumption level 
over time. W. Rogerson [1995] uses this hypothesis when he analyzes memory 
contracts. I. Macho-Stadler and P.A. Chiappori demonstrate that labor contracts 
change according to whether one assumes the hypothesis for access to credit. Where 
there is no credit market, or it is inaccessible, the contract’s memory allows an income 
smoothing over time. For a given effort level, if the agent performs during a first period, 
this is due to favorable circumstances. The corresponding financial gain is therefore 
implicitly transitory. The agent then seeks to spread this supplementary gain over time, 
which is possible if the contract has a memory.14 The other necessary condition for such 
a smoothing over time is that the employer commits himself; that is, he offers a long-
term contract. 
                                                 
14- The underlying hypothesis is that the employee’s reservation utility remains constant over time. 
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 The question, then, is to determine how this interpretation may be modified when 
the hypothesis of access to credit is introduced. If there is no rationing of the access to 
credit, then the agent may borrow any amount that he likes. In such case, the income 
smoothing takes place by relying upon this market. “Thus, the needs of smoothing 
continue to explain the existence of a memory of consumption but are no longer linked 
to the memory of wage” (P.A. Chiappori and I. Macho-Stadler [1990] p. 66). One 
possible method of making these memory contract models more complex consists of 
envisaging that the employee’s reservation utility is not stationary and that it increases 
as the employee increases his stock of human capital. Chiappori and Macho-Stadler’s 
work suggests avenues for econometric testing without actually implementing them in 
their article, written in 1990. This work is nevertheless important in that it reveals the 
significance of two variables that determine the analysis of the dynamics of labor 
contracts: contract memory and access to credit. 
 
 Other approaches have shown an interest in the dynamics of labor contracts, but 
within a different informational context, that of symmetrical learning. The precursory 
model for symmetrical learning when applied to labor contracts, is that of M. Harris 
and B. Homlstrom [1982], in which it is supposed that, at the beginning of their 
relationship, an employer and his employee are both unaware of the employee’s skills. 
They both learn at the same rate from observing the employee’s performance. 
 P.A. Chiappori, B. Salanié and J. Valentin [1999] apply this model to the analysis of 
internal labor markets and use two of Harris and Homlstrom’s hypotheses: 
symmetrical learning and downward rigidity in wages.15 From tests carried out over a 
period of 15 years on 1,000 executives working for a large French public company, they 
show how optimal contracts have a late beginner effect. This effect conveys the idea 
that if two agents A and B are at the same total wage in t0 and t2 but that A has a higher 
salary in t1, then B’s wage prospects and career will become more interesting during t3 
and subsequent periods. B is then qualified as a late beginner. This approach 
introduces an analysis in terms of career, which is defined from the sequencing of 
successive promotions. The career is assimilated to a measurement of employees’ 
performance. This study demonstrates that there exists a correlation between 
performance and contract type (wage): the employer modifies the contract in relation 
                                                 
15- Downward rigidity in wages may be justified either by the will to share the risks between the employer 
and the employee or by a hold-up problem when the contract is incomplete. 
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to the employee’s career by giving more weight to his most recent results. The memory 
is non-monotonous, and there is clearly a learning phenomenon. 
 
 We may now finally speak about how a dynamic framework may be applied to the 
analysis of manager compensation (M. Margiotta and R. Miller [2000]). This article 
addresses the policies governing managerial compensation in large companies and 
their impact upon incentives. The problem is based upon a multi-period principal-
agent model including moral hazard. The context of moral hazard may be justified in 
this case due to the fact that the shareholders have delegated their decision-making 
power over to the managers and due to the formers’ inability to observe the latters’ 
behavior directly. The econometrical tests are carried out upon a sample of managers16 
covering 34 firms, between 1948 and 1977. Based upon the analysis of panel data, 
Margiotta and Miller’s main conclusion is that there exist many advantages to 
presenting managers with greater incentives and the cost of those incentives is 
relatively low: generally, a small fraction of the firm’s shares is sufficient to induce the 
required effort level. This conclusion is rather similar to that of studies carried out 
upon cross-sectional data, although the test carried out upon longitudinal data are 
more robust and reduce selection problems.17 
 
 There are fewer empirical analyses concerning the dynamics of labor contracts 
than there are of insurance contracts, as it is without any doubt more difficult to access 
the data. These studies do, however, single out an important theme that is introduced 
into the theoretical dynamic models: that of contract memory, which may be 
represented, for instance, by the employee’s career. These works open up important 
avenues for future study, particularly in relation to the measurement of effort. 
Statistically, this measurement can be delicate and, more often than not, requires the 
use of proxy variables such as qualifications. Studies concerning panel data allow a 
more accurate evaluation of effort levels via the construction of career variables or the 
measurement of employees’ performance over time. 
                                                 
16- Only the three highest-placed managers within the firm’s hierarchy are taken into account. 
 
17- The selection problem is more obvious with cross-sectional data. In this instance, the problem is linked 
to the fact that the incentive level included in the manager’s contract depends strongly upon the firm’s 
results and yet at the same time determines those results. 
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4.3. Franchise contracts 
 
Contract theory has been widely applied to the analysis of franchise contracts (F. 
Mathewson and R. Winter [1984], [1985 a], [1985 b], P. Rey and J. Tirole [1986a] and 
[1986b]). Most frequently, however, the reasoning for such contractual franchise 
analyses comes within a static framework. With the exception of only rare articles, 
there are few elements concerning the dynamics of franchise networks and concerning 
the learning process within these networks. 
Although the first two articles to be presented privilege a theoretical approach, they 
open up avenues for further empirical analyses. F. Mathewson and R. Winter [1985 a] 
have developed a reputation model where the royalty rate and franchise fees are 
reduced for young networks that do not yet have an established reputation. More 
generally, they specify that the royalty rate ought to decrease and the franchise fees 
increase as the network’s reputation becomes more solid. Mathewson and Winter’s 
approach is not dynamic a priori; it becomes so when a reputation variable is 
introduced, which by definition has a temporal dimension. P. Rubin’s “dynamic” 
approach [1978] leads to other conclusions. According to Rubin, over time, a franchisor 
has a tendency to increase the royalty rate for his network to compensate for the 
decrease in income, which is inherent to market saturation. 
In an article that is both theoretical and empirical, N. Gallini and N. Lutz [1992], 
question the reasons for choosing a dual distribution18 mode within a network. The idea 
defended here is that the percentage of units held by a network is an indication of its 
profitability. By holding its own units, the franchisor conveys information concerning 
the demand level for the product, which is even more important when the product is 
new on the market or of a high quality. The predictions made by the model are that 
over time, the percentage of owned units and the level of royalty rate should decrease, 
insofar as the information that is disclosed concerning the franchisor and his product 
improves (at the same time, one would expect an increase of franchise fees). In other 
words, the characteristics of the contract change as the network gains in maturity. 
Gallini and Lutz propose a simple dynamic model with two periods, where information 
is disclosed at the end of the first period. 
The three approaches presented have in common the introduction of a dynamic 
approach to franchise contracts within a framework, where the problems remain static. 
                                                 
18- One speaks of dual distribution when, within the same network, franchised units coexist along with 
units which are held by the franchisor himself (owned units). 
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More specifically, it is by introducing the question of the networks’ maturity that the 
three models acquire a dynamic dimension. F. Lafontaine and K. Shaw’s article [1999] 
is different from previous works in that their empirical studies are carried out within a 
framework that is dynamic right from the start. By applying contract theory to panel 
data,19 Lafontaine and Shaw seek to answer three main questions. (i) How do firms 
modify the terms of their franchise contract as they gradually become established on 
the market? (ii) To what extent may the terms of the contract be explained by the firms’ 
individual characteristics (fixed effects)? (iii) What is the relationship between the 
royalty rate (continuous payment variable) and the franchise fees (fixed payment)? The 
econometric evaluations20 allow three important conclusions to be drawn. Whatever 
the size of the network or the levels of the royalty rate and the franchise fees, there is a 
definite stability of the contract terms over time. Networks that change their franchise 
fees do not necessarily change the levels of their royalty rate when they become more 
mature. This conclusion differs from those studies that were mentioned previously. 
Lafontaine and Shaw note that the changes made to sharing clauses may essentially be 
explained by those characteristics that are specific to the networks and not by their 
maturity. 
 
The relevance of the studies carried out upon the dynamics of franchise contracts 
enables us to envisage a generalization of this type of approach to other examples of 
inter-firm contract. The dynamics of franchise contracts highlights the role played by 
the contract clauses as variables for the adjustment of the network’s changing 
characteristics or for those of its environment. This dynamic approach to franchise 
contracts could then be extended to analyzing the flexibility of the different types of 
contractualized inter-firm organizations. Whatever the type of inter-firm contract to be 
considered, the question still remains that of constituting data bases in general and 
panel data in particular, given the recurring difficulties that exist when trying to access 
contract data. 
 
 
                                                 
19- The sample concerns 1,000 American franchise networks, observed between 1980 and 1992. 
 
20- Lafontaine and Shaw test a parametrical model of the type: Rit = βXit + µi + εit , where Rit is the royalty 
rate ; Xit is the number of years (at time t) since firm i began franchising; µi represents the characteristics 
that are specific to the firm (its technology, the value of its concept on the market, the quality of its 
management...); εit is the error term. Lafontaine and Shaw propose four estimations: two OLS regressions 
(one on the royalty rate and one on the franchise fee) and two fixed effects models (one on the royalty rate 
and one on the franchise fee). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The various examples of applications that have been presented highlight the relevance 
of moving from a static contractual framework to a dynamic one. This change of 
context brings yields contracts that are more sophisticated (insurance contracts), more 
flexible (franchise contracts) and that offer a more accurate measurement of 
informational asymmetries or effort levels (insurance or labor contracts) than those 
described in the studies carried out upon static data. Nevertheless, to date, few articles 
propose applications of dynamic contract theory and there may be several reasons for 
this. For one, the theoretical framework is demanding and rarely compatible with the 
available data. However, some key concepts of dynamic contract theory are explicitly 
used in econometric studies: commitment, renegotiation, and contract memory. 
Furthermore, access to data is one of the major difficulties encountered in empirical 
studies carried out on contracts, whether these studies are within a static or a dynamic 
framework. This problem with accessing data would explain the gap between the 
progress that has been made in the theoretical field and its applications, which, 
although there has been development, still lags behind. Progress in the field of 
modeling dynamic contracts is hindered by the gap between the theoretical and 
empirical approaches; the confirmations or invalidations that result from the empirical 
studies are of no benefit. 
 Despite these limitations, the avenues for research that have been opened up by the 
empirical studies carried out upon contract dynamics are promising. The results that 
have been achieved thus far enable us to envisage further study of the applications that 
have been presented and perspectives in other areas. The analysis proposed by Ph. 
Gagnepain, M. Ivaldi and D. Martimort [2009] is representative of this renewal. This 
analysis concerns the urban transportation sector in France, where contract theory has 
already studied, but rarely in a dynamic context. The authors keep the incentive theory 
framework but add a regulatory mechanisms à la Baron and Myerson [1982]. 
Furthermore, this approach presents a strong link between the theoretical model and 
the empirical application. Lastly, this analysis has a rich dataset (136 contracts 
observed between 1987 and 2000), presented as a series of contracts.  
 The analysis of agricultural contracts offers also interesting perspectives. These 
contracts have been subjected to numerous applications of contract theory, in 
particular where the problems surrounding sharecropping and tenant farming are 
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concerned.21 Most applications remain within a static framework (the contract is only 
analyzed over a single season). A few studies have touched upon a dynamic approach 
(B. Dutta, D. Ray and K. Sengupta [1989], G. Bose [1993]), but this approach has still to 
be developed.  
 With franchise data, the information, which is collected on a European scale, is 
increasing and becoming more precise in terms of the characteristics of contract 
clauses, and it is now possible to envisage the construction of a data panel. On a wider 
scale, it is conceivable that certain concepts inherited from the application of labor 
contracts or developed within the insurance framework may be incorporated into the 
analysis of the dynamics of vertical contracts. The question of contract memory, for 
instance, is particularly interesting for the analysis of vertical contracts. Indeed, we 
may question the nature of the memory prevailing in a vertical relationship and assume 
that the choice of contract clauses depends upon the quality of the memory to be 
included in the contract or the effective level of that memory. As with the static 
framework, the contractual clauses would be presented as modalities for incentive and 
the homogenizing of behavior within a network. By placing itself within a dynamic 
framework, however, the analysis is enriched when it takes into account the time gap 
that may exist between incentive and effort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 With a fixed-rent contract, the landowner hires his land out to a farmer for a fixed price. With a share-
cropping contract, the landowner and the farmer agree to share the production at a certain rate, which is 
often supplemented by a lump sum payment. 
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